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Despite considerable interest in the problem of cre­
ativity, both in psychology and in other fields, there is 
still no standard definition of the term. Guilford (1 9 6 7) 
defines creativity by making a distinction between convergent 
thinking and divergent thinking. In convergent thinking, 
according to Guilford, there is a single right answer or 
best answer to a problem, while in divergent thinking there 
is not. He uses the term divergent thinking interchangeably 
with creativity. Ilis research indicates that of the factors 
identified as making up divergent thinking, ideational flu­
ency, which Guilford defines as fairly rapid generation of 
units of verbal or semantic information, has least variance 
in common with intelligence. The correlation between ide­
ational fluency and convergent thinking is .01 (Guilford, 
Frick, Christensen, & Merrifield, 1957)* Since a number of 
studies have indicated fairly low correlations (around .3 ) 
between I.Q, scores and scores of creativity, at least in 
children (e.g., Getzels & Jackson, 1962), it would seem 
that ideational fluency may be an important component of 
creativity. Other writers approach the term somewhat di±‘- 
ferently. Parnes and Meadow (1959) use the criteria of 
uniqueness and usefulness as determiners of good ideas in 
their studies on creativity. Wallach and Kogan (19&5) 
speak of total number of ideas generated as well as their 
uniqueness within a given subject sample. Though ideation­
al output includes qualitative considerations as well as
2quantitative ones, the present study is concerned only with 
the quantitative —  number of ideas produced in a divergent 
thinking situation.
Most of the research in creativity to date falls into 
three areas: identification of creativity as a concept 
through a number of factor-analytic and psychometric studies; 
exjiloration of personality variables accounting for differences 
between creative and noncreative individuals; and techniques 
for increasing creativity in individuals, primarily through 
creativity training programs. The present study focuses on 
conditions affecting creative output. These conditions con­
cern the degree of restriction placed on the subject during 
the process of ideational production.
While various writers describe the stages of creative 
effort in different terms, there is agreement that evaluation 
of the creative product should come last in the creative 
process. There is the implication that evaluation occur­
ring earlier in the process might be detrimental to the pro­
cess and possibly to the end product as well. Alamshah 
(1 9 7 2) suggests that feelings of inferiority, stemming 
from criticism by self or others, are one of several common 
blocks to creativity. One can thus speculate that evalua­
tion occurring early in the creative process might result 
in one or both of two events: acceptance of the ideas gen­
erated thus far as good or at least sufficient, in which 
case no further generation is needed; or self-criticism
3of the ideas generated so far, in which case feelings of 
inadequacy may block further generation of ideas*
Turning to more experimental evidence, a number of 
studies have been conducted at the State University of New 
York at Buffalo, assessing the effects of creativity train­
ing and various instructions for creative production 
(Parnes & Noller, 1972). The work at Buffalo has consis­
tently shown that significantly more good-quality ideas are 
produced by individuals under deferred-judgment instructions 
(where evaluation is to take place after production) than 
under concurrent-judgment instructions (where evaluation is 
to take place during production). They also report that 
there is a positive correlation between quantity and quality 
of ideas, and that deferred-judgment instructions, by encour­
aging a greater quantity of ideas, seem to increase also the 
number of good-quality ideas (Parnes & Meadow, 1959)*
Xn developmental literature, where most of the work on 
creativity done so far appears, Wallach and Kogan (1 9 6 5) 
claim that playful, nonevaluative conditions produce higher 
creativity scores, Kogan and Morgan (19^9)> on the other 
hand, tested creativity in children under 11 game-like" and 
"test-like" conditions and found no superiority for the 
"game" condition. This finding is supported by Warren and 
Luria (1972) who tested fifth and sixth graders under in­
structions designed to induce low, high and neutral eval- 
uational sets, and found no differences among the different
kevaluational sets. How can the findings of the latter two 
studies be reconciled with the results of the work at Buffalo, 
the research of Renner and Renner (1971) who also found non- 
evaluative, deferred-judgment instructions to be superior, 
and the myriad creativity training programs, all of which 
reiterate the need for deferring evaluation until after cre­
ative production?
An empirical answer must, of course, await further 
research, preferably research comparing adults and children 
with respect to the effects of evaluation on the creative 
process. Theoretically, however, the dilemma does not 
seem irreconcilable if one can entertain one or both of two 
possibilities. First, the notion of a playful, noneval- 
uative condition (to borrow Wallach and Kogan*s term) may 
be very different and imply different consequences for adults 
and children. Piaget*s position that the difference between 
adults and children is often qualitative may very well apply 
to attitudinal as well as cognitive phenomena. Thus, while 
in children "playful" tends to mean "different from the rou­
tine," especially in the typical educational environment, 
and the condition is essentially an environmental one, in 
adults "play" may be a much more internalized state, a free­
dom from the threat of serious consequences, especially neg­
ative ones. One wonders how serious the consequences of 
not doing well on a creativity test were to the fifth and 
sixth graders in Warren and Luria's study, and whether there
5was any perceived essential difference between game and test 
conditions in Kogan and Morgan*s children. Both game and test 
may well have been equally a break from school routine.
Related to this apparent discrepancy between adults and 
children in the effects of evaluation on the creative process 
is an idea suggested by the model of an innovative boundary- 
formulated by Slevin (1971)• He asserts ‘that in an indus­
trial setting there is a relationship between risk and value 
of a goal requiring innovative behavior which must be main­
tained at a proper balance for innovative behavior to occur,
Xn children being tested in creativity, one might hypothe­
size both to be minimal. In college students, the usual 
subjects of the adult studies mentioned above, especially 
where the experiment is presented as part of course and stu­
dent evaluation, as in the Buffalo studies, the consequen­
ces probably assume more importance, and hence the risk is 
greater. For other adults, outside a school environment, 
only a goal of real value might evercome the risk involved —  
the threat to self-esteem ensuing from evaluation. In fact, 
Alarnshah (1967)* discussing conditions of creativity, 
claims that potential for creativity is enhanced by endeavor 
in an area that is high in the individual1s value system, 
and to which that individual is willing to devote the great­
er part of his work effort. In an experimental situation, 
where the goals are rarely perceived as real or significant, 
one might assume that evaluative threat should be at a mini-
6mum for creative production to emerge.
One further variable of concurrent evaluation that 
seems related, and that has been neglected in research on 
creativity, is that of bonuses or incentives for creative 
effort. While money is generally believed to be a powerful 
motivator, and motivation is conducive to achievement, how 
does this relate to creative effort? How do incentives 
affect concurrent judgement, and what are the effects on 
quantity and quality of ideational output?
The notion of goal definition and specificity, while 
not directly evaluative in the sense that it might threaten 
the self-image, may also relate to evaluation of the product. 
Mednick ■(1962) in somewhat cryptic fashion comments that 
when the problem solver knows the goal he is trying to 
reach, the elements of the goal become additional stimuli.
Xn Mednick's view, additional stimuli appear to be desir­
able in the creative effort since they expand the range of 
raw materials from which novel associations can be made.
In typical goal-oriented situations such as industry, how­
ever, goal definition often takes the form of limiting 
injunctions such as feasibility and usefulness. Whether 
the verbalization of these requirements in the instructions 
for creative production fit Mednick*s notion of elements of 
the goal is unclear; the possibility of their effect on the 
creative effort should be explored.
This study, then, looks at the effects on ideational
7output of instructions intended to convey nonevaluative, 
evaluative and incentive conditions, and goal only versus 
goal with feasibility and utility restrictions.
Method
Sub.jects and Design. Subjects were drawn from male 
Business Administration students at the University of Neb­
raska at Omaha (UNO) currently enrolled in four sections of 
Principles of Management. Female students were not used 
because the number of women in the Business Administration 
program at UNO was too small to permit matching across condi­
tions. Subjects were randomly assigned to one of six condi­
tions. All eighty students in the four classes were tested. 
Females and those who submitted incomplete responses were 
rejected (1^ subjects). Then, since the smallest cell size 
obtained was ten, subjects were randomly rejected from each 
of the other cells to arrive at a cell size of ten- on all six 
conditions.
The design was a 2 x 3 factorial, with two levels of 
Goal Specificity and three levels of Evaluation. The exper­
imental task was the same for all subjects: to come up with
specific new ideas for products - and/or services that would 
be marketable to communities of senior citizens. In addition, 
one covariate was used: total number of ideas generated on
the Patterns Test (PT), a measure of ideational output (¥al- 
lach & Kogan, 1 9 6 3)# This measure was used to control for
8the effect of individual differences in ideational fluency.
Procedure. All subjects were tested in the classroom 
during a regular class period of Principles of Management. 
Their instructors had announced in the previous class that 
their next class would be an experiment, so that subjects 
were free to attend or not, though they were encouraged to 
do so *
All subjects were given identical oral instructions. 
Subjects in differential experimental conditions were given 
differential instructions in writing, typed prominently in 
their work booklets. Spot checking after the experiment in­
dicated that slibjects were not aware that their instructions 
differed from those of anyone else in the room. Subjects in 
different conditions were tested at the same time, in the 
same class session, to exclude differences other than written, 
instructional ones.
The testing sequence was as follows: All subjects were
introduced to the PT, and were given about five minutes to 
practice on the first page* They were then given ten minutes 
for each of the three pages of the PT. (A copy of the PT is 
in Appendix A.) They were then told that the second part of 
the experiment is an applied task, similar to the kind of 
idea-generatioh tasks that occur in business. They were 
asked to read the instructions in their booklets carefully 
(differential instructions are listed in Appendix B), and 
not to discuss either the instructions or their ideas with
9anyone else in the room* Thirty minutes were alloted to this 
part of the experiment. The experimenter observed that no one 
was still working at the end of the thirty minutes. Finally, 
the subjects were asked to fill out a questionnaire on the last 
page of their booklets concerning their attitudes about the 
experiment. (A copy of the questionnaire is in Appendix C.)
The ideational output of each subject was scored for 
total number of ideas by seven independent judges. (A copy 
of the instructions to the judges is in Appendix D,) The judg­
es consisted of a sample of professors in the UNO School of 
Business Administration in the areas of Management, Marketing, 
Accounting, Finance and Decision Science r- the academic equiv­
alent of an industrial executive committee. Each judge scored 
the responses separately, avoiding the interactive bias of 
group evaluation. The responses from each subject were typed 
exactly as they had been written by the subject, so that the 
content remained the same, but judgment on such variables as 
neatness or handwriting was avoided. The response sheets 
were coded for subject and condition, so that the judges were 
not aware of which subject or condition they were evaluating 
at any time.
Results
Reliability and Analysis of Variance. Pearson r cor­
relation coefficients were computed for each pair of judges, 
(See Table I.) Each of the Pearson r*s were then converted
10
to z-scores, the z-scores averaged, and the average converted 
back to a Pearson r, yielding an average correlation coeffi­
cient of +0.93* High interjudge reliability was thus demon­
strated*
Table I
Between-Judge Pearson r Matrix
J1 J2 J3 J4 J5 J6
J2 * 9 2 6 0 —
J3 .9527 .9346 — — — —
J4 *9286 .9659 .9351 — — —
J3 .9510 .9234 *9466 .9360 — —
J6 .9273 .9428 .9429 .9311 .9324 —
J7 • 8310 *9186 . 8634 .9345 .8813 *9149
Judge variances were computed (see Table II), and an
F test of heterogeneity of variance yielded an F max J max
value of 1.3984. Since this failed to exceed the tabulated
F^aX of 2*17 at cx = .05 (Kirk, 1 9 6 8), it was decided that 
there was homogeneity of variance among the judges*
Table II
Judge Variances
J1 J2 J3 J4 J3 J6 J7
.125 •143 .172 .123 .128 .149 .131
Given high, interjudge reliability and homogeneity of 
variance, the number of ideas for each subject were summed 
across judges. Data for the covariate were obtained by 
counting the number of ideas generated by each subject on 
the PT* A 2 x 3 factorial analysis of covariance was then 
performed. Adjusted cell means are displyed in Table III. 
(These means represent number of ideas times number of 
judges averaged across subjects.) While there were no
Table III 
Adjusted Cell Means
No Evaluation Evaluation Incentive
Goal Only
Goal with
Specifications
significant effects found for either Goal Specificity or 
its interaction with Evaluation, Evaluation was found to 
be significant (p < .0001; see Table IV).
The Tulcey A Test of Pairwise Multiple Comparisons was 
then performed on the three levels of Evaluation (see Ta­
ble V). With df = 53* the difference between means must 
be 16.4059 to be significant at the . 0 5 level, and 2 0 . 7 7 1 2  
to be significant at the .01 level (Kirk, 1 9 6 8). The 
difference between Evaluation and Incentive was found to 
be nonsignificant, The difference between No Evaluation
7 7 .9 2U5 2 2 . 3 0 6 2 25.5721
71.597*1 27.3899 30.8098
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Table XV
Analysis of Covariance Summary Table
Source df MS F P
Goal Specificity (a ) 1 2 6 . 2 9 7 0 0.0571 p < .8121
Evaluation (b ) 2 15,523.8633 33.7414 p< .0001
A X B 2 2 0 0 . 6 3 1 1 0.4359 P < .6490
Error 53 460.2313 — -
and Evaluation, and the difference between No Evaluation and 
Incentive were both significant.
Table V
Differences between Adjusted Means (Evaluation)
No Evaluation 
Evaluation
Questionnaire Data. Questionnaire results revealed the 
subjects* mean age to be 2 6 , with a median age of 2 5 * and a 
range of 19 to 47. The mean number of years of military ex­
perience for all subjects was 4.2, with a median of 2 years, 
and a range of 0 to 22. Considering those subjects with more
No Evaluation Evaluation Incentive
(74.76095) (24.84305) (28.19095)
---- 49.9129 46.5700
---- 3.3429
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than two years of military experience to be in the military, 
26 subjects were in the military. There were no differences 
across conditions in either age or military experience.
No subject was aware of the real hypotheses of this 
study. The responses to Question Four ("Did you think of any 
ideas that you did not put down? Why?1’) resulted in a dis­
tribution of "yes" responses ranging from four to six in all 
six conditions. Thus all conditions appeared to respond sim­
ilarly to this question.
Discussion
Some caution should be exercised in generalizing the 
results of this study to an industrial setting without rep­
lication of the study using subjects already in industry.
At the same time, the student sample used here deviated 
from the typical college student sample. The average age 
of 26 is older than the usual average age for college stu­
dents. More than half of the subjects are already in busi­
ness or the military. A number of the remaining subjects 
have declared business administration as their major area 
of study. Thus the subject sample can be assumed to fall 
somewhere between college students and individuals in an 
organization. The judges represent a sample of areas found 
in the management of an organization (with the exception of 
manufacturing) and can be assumed to represent a point of 
view comparable to that of a decision-making body in an
14
organization. Given this subject/judge sample, then, the 
results should have more generalizability to business and 
organizational situations than studies using typical college 
Student Samples.
To summarize our results, no difference was found 
between Goal Only and Goal with Specifications. There was 
also no difference between Evaluation and Incentive. On the 
other hand, No Evaluation was significantly superior to both 
Evaluation and Incentive.
In idea-generating tasks in business, as in a marketing 
department, for example, it is common to have goal-limiting 
injunctions. Utility and feasibility are especially common 
requirements for new ideas. Yet our results indicate that 
these injunctions do not increase the number of ideas gen­
erated.
Bonuses as incentive to idea—generation are also believed 
to be effective. The wide-spread use of suggestion boxes is 
only one example of the use of monetary incentive for creative 
effort. Yet our results suggest that where an evaluative sit­
uation already exists, a bonus may not contribute anything 
toward overcoming inferior results. Within the limits of a 
$2.00 bonus, promising a bonus versus not promising anything 
made no difference. It would be useful to study the effects 
of incentive further by using a more substantial bonus. It 
would also be of interest to compare the effects of incentive 
in an evaluative versus a nonevaluative situation, as an
15
attempt to investigate whether the bonus itself implies 
evaluation to the subject, or whether it merely fails to 
overcome the inhibiting effects of an already expressed 
evaluative set.
A sizeable difference was found between nonevaluative 
instructions and evaluative instructions, either with or 
without incentive. The nonevaluative conditions were sig­
nificantly superior in the number of ideas produced. This 
has implications for industry, if only to question the common 
practice of a superior's saying to his subordinate: "Why
don't you come up with some good ideas for . . ." This
finding also supports the results of the work done at Buffalo 
(Parnes & Noller, 1972) where deferred-judgment instructions 
were superior to concurrent-judgment instructions.
Further research needs to be done to evaluate the quality 
of ideas produced under these differential conditions, and 
the author is currently analyzing qualitative evaluations 
of the ideas generated by this sample of subjects. Results 
to date suggest that nonevaluative conditions might produce 
not only greater numbers of ideas, but greater numbers of 
high-quality ideas as well.
At this point it is not inappropriate to indulge in 
some speculation as to what subject variables may be oper­
ating to produce the superiority of the No Evaluation con­
dition. Since it was the least restrictive condition that 
produced the most superior quantitative result, it seems
16
reasonable to hypothesize that the output under nonrestrictive 
conditions most closely approximates baseline creative ability, 
while the other conditions inhibit emergence of the baseline 
level# To put it simply% fostering creativity may be a matter 
of permitting a person to be creative, rather than helping or 
making him creative.
It is interesting to note that the questionnaire failed 
to show any real differences among conditions in ideas report­
ed as generated but not written down. At this point, one can 
only speculate about the possible causes for the apparent 
discrepancy between experimental results and self-report data. 
Instructional manipulation produced a significant difference 
between No Evaluation and both Evaluation and Incentive, yet 
questionnaire data revealed no differences among conditions.
It may be that the questionnaire was not sufficiently sensi­
tive to show differences even though those differences existed. 
Another interpretation is that some factor such as social 
desirability was operating to produce essentially random 
results on the questionnaire. A third possible explanation, 
and one that would tie in with a theory of ego-threat in 
evaluative situations, is that subjects in the evaluative 
conditions were unwilling to admit that they had come up 
with tfbadM ideas, or even suppressed the negative results of 
an evaluation that was part of the creative process since 
these negative results were ego-threatening, and hence the 
subjects were truly unaware of these rejected "bad” ideas.
17
Both Alamshah’s philosophical speculations (1972) and Slevin*s 
model of an innovative boundary (1971) suggest that risk, 
possibly of an ego-threatening sort, serves to inhibit 
ideational output or creativity. Further research should be 
done to investigate these hypotheses.
Finally, one might speculate whether the imposition of 
evaluation does not violate Guilford’s definition of divergent 
thinking. When a subject is asked to come up with good ideas, 
there is an automatic implication of some criterion that 
differentiates good from bad. While this does not necessar­
ily imply a single correct response, Guilford’s distinguish­
ing characteristic of convergent thinking, neither does it 
assure the absence of it. Might evaluation concomitant with 
creative production, then, be perceived as convergent think­
ing in divergent thinking’s clothing?
In creative activity optimum motivational states may 
be quite different from those required for other types of 
cognitive behavior. Guilford’s separation of thinking into 
convergent and divergent types is useful in starting to 
define the difference between mental ability and creative 
ability. But, whatever creativity is, how does it emerge?
What motivational states, what personality factors, what 
situational conditions contribute to the emergence or 
suppression of creative productivity? This paper is an 
initial step toward studying this aspect of creativity.
18
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Appendix A 
Patterns Test (PT)
You are going to look at some drawings. See how many 
different things you can think of that these drawings might 
be •
Here is an example.
What might this drawing be?
Two things this might be are written in it might be 
a porcupine, or the sun coming up. Think of some more things 
it could be and write them in the blank spaces.
You don’t have to write long answers —  just enough so 
we know what your idea was,
1/hen you are ready to start on the first drawing on the 
next page, put your pencil down and look up.
PLEASE DO NOT TURN THIS PAGE UNTIL YOU ARE ASKED TO.
21
1 .
What do you think this drawing might be?
PLEASE DO NOT TURN THIS PAGE UNTIL YOU ARE ASKED TO.
22
2.
Wliat do you think this drawing: might be?
PLEASE DO NOT TURN THIS PAGE UNTIL YOU ARE ASKED TO
What do you think this drawing might be?
PLEASE DO NOT TURN THIS PAGE UNTIL YOU ARE ASKED TO
2 k
Appendix B 
Instructions for Differential Conditions
Condition 11 (Goal Only; No Evaluation):
Please list all the ideas that come to your mind without 
judging them in any way. Forget about the quality of 
ideas entirely. The key point is only quantity on this 
task. Express any idea that comes to your mind.
Condition 12 (Goal Only; Evaluation):
Please list all the good ideas you can think up. A 
group of judges from the Business Administration faculty 
will evaluate the quantity and quality of good ideas you 
produce. Don*t put down any idea unless you feel it is 
a good one.
Condition 13 (Goal Only; Incentive);
Please list all the good ideas you can think up. A 
group of judges from the Business Administration faculty 
will evaluate the quantity and quality of good ideas you 
produce. Don*t put down any idea unless you feel it is 
a good one.
In addition, a bonus of $2.00 will be awarded for-each 
of the ten best ideas in the group. We will mail the 
bonuses for the best ideas within two weeks. Please 
write down your mailing address in the space below.
Condition 21 (Goal with Specifications; No Evaluation):
Please list all the ideas that come to your mind that 
are feasible and useful. Forget about the quality of 
ideas entirely. The key point is only quantity on this 
task. Express any idea which comes to your mind that 
is feasible and useful.
Condition 22 (Goal with Specifications; Evaluation);
Please list all the good ideas that are also feasible 
and useful that you can think up. A group of judges 
from the Business Administration faculty will evaluate 
the quantity and quality of good ideas you produce.
Don*t put down any idea, even a feasible and useful one, 
unless you feel it is a good idea.
25
Condition 23 (Goal with Specifications; Incentive):
Please list all the good ideas that are also feasible 
and useful that you can think up. A group of judges 
from the Business Administration faculty will evaluate 
the quantity and quality of good ideas you produce. 
Don't put down any idea, even a feasible and useful 
one, unless you feel it is a good idea.
In addition, a bonus of $2,00 will be awarded for each 
of the ten best ideas in the group. We will mail the 
bonuses for the best ideas within two weeks. Please 
write down your mailing address in the space below.
2 6
Appendix C
Bio,graphical Infonnation
NAME S. S. #:
AGE: YEARS OF MILITARY EXPERIENCE
Questionnaire
1• I/ere you aware of what hypothesis was being tested in this 
study?
2, What do you think was being studied in this experiment?
3. What constraints or limitations did you feel were placed 
on your responses in this experiment?
Did you think of any ideas that you did not put down? 
Why?
5. How did you feel about participating in this experiment?
27
Appendix D 
Instructions to Judges
Tour task is to determine iiow many ideas tiiere are on 
each sheet. THESE IDEAS ARE NOT TO BE EVALUATED IN ANY WAY
BEYOND DETERMINING SEPARATE, DISTINCT IDEAS. There may be
cases where a whole paragraph or more is only one idea with 
elaborations. On the other hand, only one sentence or even 
phrase may contain more than one separate idea.
4
Your judgments on quantity should follow these steps:
A. Read the entire set of* responses for all subjects
first. This will give you a feeling for the kind
of response population you are dealing with, and
will make subsequent discriminations easier.
B. Then decide how many separate ideas there are on a 
given response sheet and identify them from 111M to 
"n" on the lines at the left margin. Some of the
responses have been given in the form of para­
graphs rather than separate items. The lengthier 
ones have been double-spaced for easier reading 
and scoring. If there are no lines for identifying 
and marking the number of a separate idea on the 
left margin, please make them yourself.
C. Finally, indicate the total number of ideas for
the given response sheet at the bottom of the sheet.
